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Business processes represent the operational capabili-
ties of an organization. In order to ensure process conti-
nuity, the effective management of risk becomes an area 
of key concern. In this paper we propose an approach for 
supporting risk identification with the use of higher-level 
organizational models.  We provide some intuitive met-
rics for extracting measures of actor criticality, and vul-
nerability from organizational models.  This helps direct 
risk management to areas of critical importance within 
organization models. Additionally, the information can be 
used to assess alternative organizational structures in 
domains where risk mitigation is crucial.  At the process 
level, these measures can be used to help direct improve-
ments to the robustness and failsafe capabilities of critical 
or vulnerable processes.  We believe our novel approach, 
will provide added benefits when used with other ap-
proaches to risk management during business process 
management, that do not reference the greater organiza-
tional context during risk assessment. 
1. Introduction 
  A Business Process can be described as a set of dy-
namically coordinated activities, controlled by a number 
of socially dependant participants, aimed towards the 
achievement of a specific operational objective [7] [11].  
Business Process Management is a re-emerging discipline, 
aimed towards supporting the effective and automated [11] 
management of business processes within an organization 
via specialized tools and methods.  Business Process 
Management promotes that a clear understanding through 
the explicit modelling of the processes underlying an 
organization is required to support effective organiza-
tional management / improvement practices [4].  
  An effective means to represent and manage opera-
tional risk is one of the most important capabilities within 
an enterprise.  Some of the most prominent applications 
of risk management techniques include financial / opera-
tional management and modelling of organizations.  Risk 
management techniques have also been extensively stud-
ied and applied within software process management, 
requirements engineering and project management disci-
plines [20] [24].  More recently, risk management has 
been applied to the business process management and 
modelling domain that as a whole, aims to bridge the gap 
between organizational and I.T. level conceptual / man-
agement concerns [16] [18] [19].  These approaches 
provide a more direct association between organizational 
risks at an activity level. 
  There are difficulties associated to addressing risk at 
process level. We believe that by taking actor-level con-
siderations such as vulnerability and criticality (at organ-
izational level) as major considerations is important for 
process-level risk management. We provide an approach 
to support risk management by supporting the identifica-
tion of risk factors (in terms of vulnerability and criticality) 
at organizational level prior to their propagation and 
reflection at a process level.  We believe that such an 
approach will provide a higher-level scope for risk that 
may span numerous processes within an organization.  
Business process risk analysis should be based on 
higher-level organizational models. A high-level approach 
to iterative risk assessment should be integrated through-
out the business process lifecycle. Therefore, risks may be 
identified and managed at an organizational level prior to 
their delegation to actual business processes.  We pro-
vide an enhanced capability to relate risk at an organiza-
tional level by looking at the strategic relationships be-
tween functional units and process participants. We define 
risk at organizational model level on the basis of vulner-
ability and criticality. For organizational modelling we use 
the agent-oriented organizational modelling notation – i* 
[13] that describes the organizational relationships among 
various actors and their rationales. For business process 
model representation we use a standardized, operational 
and executable process modelling notation – BPMN [12]. 
The authors consider that the majority of risks identified 
lie in mismatch with the methods employed within the 
various phases of the process lifecycle, a lack of clarity 
who is responsible for the individual phases or their re-
sults and a mismatch of process design, automation and 
evaluation objects. We believe that risk can be better 
viewed by using a combined notation proposed in [12].  
  The following section starts with a discussion of risk 
and risk management and our chosen notations. We then 
describe our approach to identify risk factors including 
our proposed measurement for vulnerability and criticality 
of actors at organizational level. Finally we illustrate the 
integration of risk factors in process model with examples 
and then some concluding remarks. 
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2. Background 
Agent Oriented Conceptual Modelling 
  The agent metaphor is powerful in modelling organiza-
tional contexts. Agent-Oriented Conceptual Modelling 
(AOCM) in notations such as the i* framework [13] (see: 
figure 1) have gained considerable currency in the recent 
past. Such notations model rich organizational contexts 
and offer high-level social/anthropomorphic abstractions 
(such as goals, tasks, soft goals and dependencies) as 
modelling constructs. 
  It has been argued that notations such as i* help answer 
questions such as what goals exist, how key actors depend 
on each other and what alternatives must be considered.  
Furthermore, i* has been acknowledged as illustrating the 
key social/strategic inter-relationships between actors [6] 
[13] required for effective business process redesign.  
This is achieved via support for reasoning about organiza-
tional activities and their assignment to various organiza-
tional agents [13] in respect to: the ability, workability, 
viability, and believability of their routines; and, level of 
commitment [13]. 
  The central concept in i* is that of intentional actor.  
These can be seen in the Meeting Scheduling model as 
nodes representing the intentional/social relationships 
between three (3) actors required to schedule a meeting: a 
Meeting Initiator (MI); Meeting Scheduler (MS); and 
Meeting Participant (MP). 
  The i* framework consists of two modelling compo-
nents: Strategic Dependency (SD) Models and Strategic 
Rationale (SR) Models [13].  The SD model consists of a 
set of nodes and links. Each node represents an actor, and 
each link between the two actors indicates that one actor 
depends on the other for something (i.e. goals, task, re-
source, and soft-goal) in order that the former may attain 
some goal. The depending actor is known as depender, 
while the actor depended upon is known as the dependee. 
The object around which the dependency relationship 
centers is called the dependum.  The SR mode further 
represents internal motivations and capabilities (i.e. proc-
esses or routines) accessible to specific actors that ensure 
dependencies can be met. 
  The intentional properties of an agent such as goals, 
beliefs, abilities and commitments are used in i* for mod-
elling organizations [13]. Actors are [inter]related through 
dependencies that may involve goals to be achieved (e.g. 
Evacuation & RescueMission), tasks to be performed (e.g. 
GatheringLocalInformation), resources to be furnished 
(e.g. FieldInformation), or soft-goals to be satisfied (e.g. 
RespondFast). 
Business Process Modelling with BPMN 
  Many existing BPM notations primarily focus on tech-
nical process aspects including the flow of activity execu-
tion/information and/or resource usage/consumption [13].  
This perspective is aimed at describing the sequence of 
activities, events and decisions that are made during 
process execution, however social and intentional com-
ponents lack representation.  The technical focus of these 
notations is especially suited for applications in the de-
scription, execution and simulation of business processes 
but is lacking in support for process redesign and im-
provement [13]. 
  One such notation is the Business Process Modelling 
Notation (BPMN), developed by the Business Process 
Management Initiative (BPMI.org).  BPMN can be seen 
as primarily a technically-oriented notation that is aug-
mented with an ability to assign activity execution control 
to entities (e.g. roles) within an organization with 
‘swim-lanes’.  This effectively provides a view of the 
responsibilities and required communications between 
classes of process participants, but does not provide a view 
of other social and intentional characteristics including the 
goals of participants and their inter-dependencies. 
Processes are represented in BPMN using flow nodes: 
events (circles), activities (rounded boxes), and decisions 
(diamonds); connecting objects: control flow links (un-
broken directed lines), and message flow links (broken 
directed lines); and swim-lanes: pools (high-level rectan-
gular container), and lanes partitioning pools.  These 
concepts are further discussed within [12]. 
  Since its initial publication [12], BPMN has been ac-
cepted by the greater Business Process Management 
community [1] [11], due to its expressiveness and ability to 
map directly to executable process languages including 
XPDL [4] and BPEL [10] [12]. The wide uptake of the 
notation by most Business Process Modelling tool vendors 
is also a sign of its longevity [4].  Some practitioners have 
hailed BPMN as supplying a rich representation that 
allows Business Process Management Systems (BPMS) 
the ability to control the required interactions with humans 
and 3rd party applications [9]. Furthermore, an analysis of 
BPMN also stated its high maturity in representing con-
cepts required for modelling business process, apart from 
some limitations in terms of representing state, and the 
possible ambiguity of the swim-lane concept [1]. 
3. Identifying Risk within Organizational 
Models 
  In this section we will describe our intuitive approach to 
analysis and design with regards to organizational risk.  In 
order to achieve this task, we propose an analysis of stra-
tegic dependencies between actors in order to measure and 
identify each actor’s vulnerability and criticality. Once 
determined, the design task will be focused towards the 
area of process modelling that requires most attention. 
Vulnerability 
  The vulnerability of an actor plays a vital role for iden-
tifying and measuring risk. The i* model provides an 
intentional description of a process in terms of a network of 
dependency relationships among actors [13].  We believe 
because of its richer modelling concepts, the model pro-
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vides a better basis for an analyst to explore the broader 
risk implications of alternative organizational structure. It 
can help analyze opportunities and vulnerabilities and 
recognize patterns of relationship. A depender actor’s 
intention is to have the dependency goal achieved, task 
performed, or resource available. Failure to obtain the 
dependum can affect the process by making it more vul-
nerable and hence increasing the likelihood of risk occur-
rence. In our work we propose a way of measuring vul-
nerability of actors at organizational model. The analyst 
can then take necessary steps to mitigate these vulner-
abilities in process models. A stronger degree of vulner-
ability implies that a stronger initiative to mitigate vul-
nerability is necessary. Such initiative can be taken by 
increasing the monitoring process of dependee actor’s 
activities. 
  We propose a metric for actor vulnerability.  This metric 
is effectively divides the number of outgoing dependencies 
by the number of dependee actors. A depender actor with 
more outgoing dependencies implies a greater degree of 
vulnerability. We consider outgoing dependencies for 
vulnerability measurement as we believe that outgoing 
dependencies indicate delegation of tasks and activities. If 
the tasks are delegated to other actors the depender actor 
becomes vulnerable. In case of the failure of dependee 
actor to satisfy the dependency, the corresponding 
task/goal might not be satisfied (a considerable risk). The 
vulnerability of actors thus is related to the likelihood of a 
risk occurring. We believe if an actor is vulnerable, an 
increase in the overall likelihood of risk occurrence is 
apparent.  Intuitively, if the likelihood increases risk will 
increase as well. 
  The formula we use to assess the vulnerability meas-
urement (VM) of actors is as follows:  
VM =No of Outgoing Dependencies / No of Dependee 
Actors 
For example, for actor EmergencyCoordinationCentre-
Coordinator,  
No of Outgoing dependencies = 12 
No of Dependee Actors = 4  
So, Vulnerability, VM= (12/4) = 3 
Table 1: Vulnerability Measurement of Actors 
















12 4 3 
Weather Bu-
reau 
0 0 None 










7 3 2.33 
Community 8 3 2.66 
  In a softgoal-dependency, a depender depends on the 
dependee to perform certain goals or task that would 
enhance the performance. The notion of a softgoal derives 
from the Non-Functional Requirements (NFR) framework 
[2] and is commonly used to represent optimization ob-
jectives, preferences or specifications of desirable (but not 
necessarily essential) states of affairs. So, softgoals are 
non-functional requirements of the system, which have 
positive or negative contribution toward achieving a goal, 
task, or resource. While measuring the vulnerability of 
actors we do not included the softgoal dependencies. We 
believe these non-functional requirements of the system 
have minimal impact on risk either in the organizational 
level or on the process level.  When we calculate the 
outgoing dependencies of actors we exclude the softgoal 
dependency.  
  If any actor has no outgoing dependency with other 
actors, we do not take that actor for vulnerability meas-
urement. We believe such actor has no vulnerability as it 
can not affect the likelihood of occurrence. From figure-1 
we find that the actors WeatherBureau and CallTaking-
Superviosr/System do not have any outgoing dependencies. 
It means they have not delegated their responsibilities or 
tasks to other actors. But, actor with no vulnerability does 
not necessarily mean that it is not critical enough to affect 
the consequences if it fails. In this case criticality of the 
actor is considered to measure the risk. 
Criticality 
  Criticality is the consequence factor that is measured 
from the impact of an actor’s performance where the actor 
is assigned to satisfy responsibilities/incoming dependen-
cies. The more critical an actor is, the more ability it carries 
to impact other actors and the organizational context. 
Incoming dependencies towards an actor are taken into 
consideration to measure the criticality of an actor. The 
incoming dependencies describe responsibilities are as-
signed to an actor from other actor. By receiving depend-
encies from other actor makes the dependency receiving 
actor crucial. If it fails to satisfy the incoming dependen-
cies the depender actors are widely affected which possibly 
affect the context as a whole. In order to mitigate the risks 
associated with the system the criticality measurement of 
actors should be taken into consideration. Measuring 
critical factors of actors helps the analysts to analyze and 
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construct alternative options to achieve the aim of the 
system. This will alleviate the risk management and in-
crease the robustness of the system. 
  Criticality of actors is measured by multiplying number 
of incoming dependencies and number of depender actors.   
The formula we use to assess the criticality measurement 
(CM) of actors is as follows: 
CM = No of Incoming Dependencies * No of Depender 
Actors  
For example, for actor Volunteer,  
No of Incoming Dependencies = 10  
No of Depender Actors = 3 
So, Criticality, CM= 10*3 = 30 



























9 3 27 
Weather Bu-
reau 2 1 2 
Community 2 1 2 
 
  According to the result from Criticality Metrics, Vol-
unteer actor is more critical than other actor in the model. 
Volunteer has ten incoming dependencies from three 
other actors and its existence is more crucial because if it 
fails to satisfy any of the incoming dependencies received 
from other three actors it will have greater impact on 
other actors and to system as a whole. We have not con-
sidered the softgoal dependencies while calculating the 
criticality of the actors for the same reasons of vulnerabil-
ity measurement.    
  If an actor does not have any incoming dependencies 
from another actor of the model then it portrays that the 
actor has distributed his dependencies to other actor but 
no other actor has delegated any tasks, resources and 
goals into this actor. So the actor will have no impact on 
the consequences of the performance of other actors in the 
strategic context of the model. For this reason an actor 
with no incoming dependencies will be positioned with no 
criticality fact towards it but the vulnerability factor of 
that actor will take it into the consideration of the risk 
measurement in the strategic framework. 
4.  Integrating Risks in Business Process 
Models 
Treating Vulnerable Actors 
  We believe that every actor in the business processes 
should be given a relative level of effort to mitigate vul-
nerability via robustness and efficiency. We suggest for the 
more vulnerable actors more monitoring of the tasks/ 
sub-tasks is necessary. Monitoring of the business process 
means tracking the individual tasks or subtask in a process 
so that information on their state can be easily made visi-
ble. It is done to measure the satisfactory performance of a 
business process. Business process tasks of the vulnerable 
actors need more monitoring so that we can continually 
refine them based on feedback that comes directly from 
operational level.  
 
Figure 2: Business Process Model in BPMN 
  This process model has two actors WeatherBureau and 
EmergencyCoordinationCentreCoordinator (ECCC) with 
few tasks and subtask. The model also represents exception 
handling procedure for RecieveForecast task. From ta-
ble-1, we find that ECCC is the most vulnerable actor 
which implies more monitoring of the tasks and subtask 
inside this process is required.  
 
Figure 3: Extended Process Model Reflecting the Vulner-
able Actor. 
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  The process model in figure 2 is improved in figure 3 by 
using our notion of vulnerability. The exception for Re-
cieveForecast task is handled by QueryBureau 
sub-process. We extend this model by integrating Ap-
plyRiskMitigation sub-process. This sub-process includes 
the risk mitigation procedures which takes place in case of 
the failure of QueryBureau sub-process. 
  The analyst should design the organizational model or 
process model carefully while delegating the dependencies 
from one actor to other actors. Actor with dependencies 
over only one actor is more vulnerable then actor with 
dependencies with multiple actors. For example, the 
vulnerability level of actor A1 is 4 and actor B1 is 1. Actor 
A1 has four dependencies over A2. If actor A2 fails then all 
the dependencies will remain unsatisfied.  On the other 
hand actor B1 has delegated its dependencies over four 
actors. If any of the four dependee actor fails one de-
pendency will remain unsatisfied, but the others might be 
satisfied. Thus actor A1 is more vulnerable than actor B1. 
Figure 4: Delegation of Dependencies among Actors. 
Treating Critical Actors: 
  Volunteer actor is the most critical actor according to the 
the matrix. In this case the three actors ECCC, FieldCon-
trolCentreCoordinator(FCCC) and Community are de-
pendant on Volunteer actor to accomplish their certain 
objectives. Failure to satisfy these objectives/incoming 
dependencies will have a big impact on the performance of 
the depender actors and to the system as a whole. To 
minimize the criticality levels of actors, the analyst needs 
to have pragmatic and profound process delegation strat-
egy.  
  The tasks and sub-processes of the most critical actors 
should be robustly planned to make the whole process 
successful. To make the process robust the analysts need to 
identify what is the overall objective of the process. This 
should describe problems to be solved, issues to be ad-
dressed, key participants, whether all the tasks are well 
integrated within the process and how the process add 
values and quality to the system.  
 
Figure 5: Business Process Model in BPMN 
  The objective of the process in figure-5 is to provide a 
Flood/Storm Safety advice to the Community. Volunteer 
provides the safety advice to the Community. For the well 
completion of the process Volunteer needs to have local 
information and rescue equipments which are done by 
FieldControlCenterCoordinator by accomplishing two 
tasks GatherLocalInformation and ArrangeRes-
cue/EvacuationEquipment. Upon successful completion of 
the task ReceiveRescueEquipments the Community re-
ceives the message ProvideFlood/StormSafetyAdvice from 
Volunteer in the FollowEvacuationProcedures tasks which 
add values to the process of evacuation.  
 
Figure 6: Extended Process Model Reflecting the Critical 
Actor. 
  The above process model is extended from figure 5 by 
introducing an exception handling technique in Volun-
teer’s RecieveRescueEquipments task to manage its satis-
factory performance. If the Volunteer does not receive the 
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rescue equipments from FCCC the process will throw an 
exception which sends query to FCCC. To handle the risks 
from negative response from the FCCC a MitigateRisk 
sub-process is introduced. Exception handling should be 
taken into thoughtful consideration by the analyst as 
exceptions may arise in any stages of the process.  
  The processes of the critical actors should have mutual 
consistency to reduce criticality and increases process 
performance. If a process is allocated to an actor, which the 
actor may not be capable of performing, it is likely to delay 
the process which could lead to a disaster. Clearly speci-
fied activities for the actors should be one of the most 
important priorities to the analyst. It makes easy to com-
prehend and allocate resourceful process design to ease the 
modification of processes.  
5.  Conclusion 
  In this work we have presented a discussion on how we 
can identify risk in terms of vulnerability and criticality in 
organizational models. We have also provided a way to 
integrate risks within the process model. We believe it 
helps the analyst while to design organizational models, 
delegate dependencies among various actors, choose 
alternatives, decompose tasks, maintain consistency 
among organizational and process models, handle excep-
tions etc. However, we have considered the concept of 
vulnerability and criticality of actors only. We have not 
considered our notions on the activities and sub-process for 
assessing risks. Our future work will deal with the com-
bination of actors and their tasks and sub-processes. Our 
proposal is based on a combined notation (i*-BPMN) 
which might not be suitable for organizations using dif-
ferent notations. However, we wish apply our proposal to 
different notations in the future. 
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